


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Outline Of Reference Paper On:

THE REAL REASON FOR MOLOTOV'S TRANSFER TO VIENNA

The assignment of former high-ranking Soviet statesman Vyacheslav M. Molotov to Vienna as the Soviet representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency does not indicate fears of a return to Stalinism but a desire to remove a Stalinist relic.

The possibility of Molotov's political rebirth through the agency can be discounted because the conveyor belt to the top in the Soviet government is activated strictly by Party machinery. And Molotov has been successfully shunted from his Party jobs.

Also, Molotov's name is firmly linked with the Stalin era--a period of fear, terror and deprivation.

The changes that have taken place in the Soviet Union since the end of the era in 1953 make it virtually certain that Molotov cannot return in any capacity of leadership.

Molotov's removal from his post as the Soviet Ambassador to Outer Mongolia is still another indication of the present deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations. The regime does not relish the idea of Molotov's going into retirement in Moscow, where the game of Soviet internal politics can be played, and therefore it is expedient to move him out of the Soviet orbit.

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No. 1, 1960/61

THE REAL REASON FOR MOLOTOV'S TRANSFER TO VIENNA

The real reason for the transfer of former Prime Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov from Outer Mongolia to Vienna, Austria, is not, as has been suggested, an indication of a revival of Stalinist influence. Rather, it is an expression of the desire to remove from the Soviet scene a reminder of Stalinist times.

Before his appointment on August 23, 1960, as the Soviet representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Molotov had been since July, 1957 in virtual exile in Ulan-Bator as the nominal Soviet Ambassador to Outer Mongolia. The transfer to Vienna of the former First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and the former Foreign Minister of many years standing raised a number of eyebrows in the Western press, inasmuch as the official he replaced was of third-rate importance. Most commentators in responsible Western newspapers did not, however, surrender to the temptation to link Molotov's removal from Outer Mongolia with the increasing tension in Sino-Soviet relations. Mongolia has long acted as a buffer zone between the USSR and China. For example, the authoritative German weekly Christ Und Welt (Christ and the World, No. 36, September 1, 1960), wrote: "It is improbable that a man trained in the school of Stalin should share the adventurist tendencies of the Chinese.

Yet commentators have pointed out the conservative nature of Molotov's political views, which bring this dogmatist close to the Chinese Orthodox Communists. Christ Und Welt considers it likely that Molotov's views coincide with those of Mao Tse-Tung, Chairman of the People's Republic. Only a few analysts have speculated whether the International Atomic Agency will not prove to be the "back door" through which the veteran Stalinist, rehabilitated thanks to what many Party men regard as Khrushchev's blunders, will reappear on the Soviet political arena. This can be rejected for two reasons:

In the first place, the road to power in the USSR does not meander through international commissions, the foreign ministry or even the governmental machine, but it rolls straight through the leading organs of the Party. And in the Party Molotov is now no more than an ordinary member. The key to power was almost in his hands only for one brief moment when, at the end of June 1957,

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the Presidium of the Party Central Committee resolved to remove Khrushchev from his post as the First Secretary and to replace him with Molotov. When Molotov and his associates--Kaganovich, Malenkov, and Shepilov--allowed the struggle for power to be transferred to the Plenum of the Party Central Committee, they gave Khrushchev the opportunity to seize the key to power from their hands.

In the second place, Molotov's name in the USSR is firmly linked with recollections of the Stalin era, which stands for ruthless suppression of all morality, for complete absence of the rule of law and of personal security, for universal fear, for hard living conditions and for acute shortage of objects of everyday necessity. The Stalinist regime is still alive in the memories not only of the older generation but also of young people. Things have changed in the seven and a half years since Stalin's death. The nature of these changes and the impossibility of a return to Stalinism are best illustrated by the following four points:

1. The death of seven out of nine MVD and KGB (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Committee of State Security) leaders, as well as the considerable reduction in the personnel of the MVD and KGB, has made it virtually impossible for the present Soviet leaders to return to the terrorism of Stalin's day.

2. The number of prisoners in the post-Stalin period has been reduced to at least one third or one quarter of what it was. Moreover, the authorities today are not in a position to impose court sentences on a mass scale, and are obliged to substitute economic and psychological pressure upon the population at large.

3. The rise of the standard of living and the consolidated position of the new bourgeoisie make it impossible for the government to keep the masses in their former status of unlimited exploitation and enslavement.

4. The Party's methods of asserting itself have changed. The old centralism of Stalin's day has given way to Khrushchev's technique of playing the touring diplomat and of making liberal use of the public rostrum at home. The transformation of the virtual head of state from a narrow-eyed tyrant into a commercial traveler of Communism, who is obliged to offer bribes in order to win popularity, leaves Molotov with neither the psychological nor the physical possibility of reverting to the old Stalinist routine.

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In view of these considerations, Molotov's appointment to Vienna must be regarded not as the beginning of a return to favor but as an act of ostracism--a veiled but nevertheless forcible removal from Soviet territory, reminiscent of the removal of Trotsky. The question now arises: if Molotov's outdated views do not make him a dangerous rival to Khrushchev, why did the Soviet Premier have to recall him from Ulan-Bator and deport him beyond the borders of the Communist bloc? If it had been dangerous to let him live in the buffer zone between the USSR and China, he might have been allowed to settle in Moscow with a well-deserved Communist pension, as Bulganin and Kaganovich were.

Almost all the purges and political trials under Lenin, Stalin and their successors have been precautionary measures designed to remove potential enemies or rivals. Molotov's spiritual kinship with the Chinese dogmatists was quite sufficient, therefore, to make his removal from the Chinese frontier imperative. The attempts to appoint him as Soviet Ambassador to the Netherlands and then to Greece coincided with a deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations. Thus, his present transfer was occasioned by the rigorous Communist law of anticipating dangers and is another indication of the present deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations.

So much for Molotov's removal from Mongolia. His residence in Moscow is made problematic by the internal difficulties that are now being experienced by the Soviet leadership. Even though Molotov's outlook has not changed with the times, his presence in Moscow or anywhere in the USSR is evidently regarded as undesirable at the present stage, if not dangerous. The reluctance of the Soviet leaders to keep this Communist of the old school in their immediate vicinity becomes understandable if we bear in mind the contrast between the rigid attitude of Molotov and the adventurist, revisionist policy of Khrushchev, between Molotov and the petty figures that today occupy the Soviet Olympus. It is significant that the Soviet press has so far not had a word to say about Molotov's recent transfer.

Molotov's residence abroad constitutes no threat to the state security of the USSR since his loyalty to Communism is unquestioned, but the fact that social considerations can move the Soviet leaders to send him away to live in the free world is a clear indication of the instability of the internal situation in the USSR.

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